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# The Relationship Between Power-Sharing and Separatism: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis

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The Relationship Between Power-Sharing and Separatism:

A Qualitative Comparative Analysis

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## Introduction and Statement of Purpose

In 1991, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fractured, sparking ethnic division and war after being united for nearly fifty years under the iron fist of a powerful communist leader. Nations vied for territorial control, and political leaders garnered support by appealing to ethnic self-determination. Irredentism and brutal ethnic cleansing eradicated communities across the Balkans. Today, the former Yugoslavia exists as seven sovereign states. The term "balkanization" now characterizes political fragmentation.

The breakup of Yugoslavia doesn't represent a common political trend, but rather an uncommon trend. Many multiethnic states exist today and remain unified after hundreds of years. Separatist or autonomist movements do spring up in these places, but these states manage to remain united. How do these places satisfy the political ambitions of minority groups? What mechanisms ensure the unity and stability of multiethnic states? Under what conditions does popular support for separatism or autonomism thrive in deeply divided societies?

State borders on maps do not always correspond with how they exist in actuality. Regionalism and ethnonationalism complicate political and territorial dynamics within a state. In some cases, it appears that the federal arrangements of certain subnational territories within a larger state can threaten national stability. Some states have attempted to ease ethnic tension by adopting power-sharing policies. *Consociationalism*, in which political arrangements are designed to encourage inclusiveness and cooperation, has been touted as one approach to safeguarding stable democracy in multiethnic states. Its effectiveness is not entirely clear, and the scholarship present varying reports of how it affects support for separatism and

ethnonationalism. This study will compare the level of support for separatist movements in countries that have implemented consociational policies and in those that have not.

## **Literature Review**

### *A General Overview of Consociationalism*

Arend Lijphart, the leading scholar on consociational theory, suggests that "power sharing is a necessary...condition for democracy in deeply divided countries" ("Puzzle" 258). He argues that India, one of the most diverse countries in the world, most successfully quells regionalist sentiment during the periods in which it adopts more consociational policies that are inclusive of minorities in politics and protect minority rights (Lijphart, "Puzzle" 258). A consociational state is broadly defined by the following features:

(1) grand coalition governments that include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups, (2) cultural autonomy for these groups, (3) proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments, and (4) a minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy (Lijphart, "Puzzle" 258).

Conversely, he states that under majoritarian systems of government, "stable democracy in deeply divided countries [is] highly unlikely" (Lijphart "Puzzle" 258). If Lijphart is correct, then consociational states should lack support for ethnonationalist and separatist groups.

According to Lijphart, one of the most significant factors necessary for successful consociational systems is "proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments" ("Puzzle" 258). Consociational theory posits that "majoritarian methods have the tendency to overrepresent majorities" and to deny political space to minorities, thus fueling stratification and cleavages. Florian Bieber agrees, and praises the Belgian "regulation of the

equal number of Flemish and Walloons in Government" and the consequent necessity to form coalitions (85).

However, Bieber also observes that ethnic quotas in Bosnia have not been as constructive. Bosnian political proportionality "places national identity over competence," as each region is only allowed to elect members of the dominant ethnic group (Bieber 85). Therefore, the three main parties in Bosnia are based primarily on ethnicity and are so dominant in their respective regions that there is not "a clear distinction between state and party structures" (Bieber 86). While this arrangement may be preferable to the violence of the 1990s, it may not bode well for the suppression of future ethnonationalism in the country and the effectiveness of quotas as a consociational solution.

Another key element of consociationalism is the promotion of cultural autonomy in order to satisfy minority desires for political recognition. Lijphart includes accommodations such as linguistic federalism and publicly-funded autonomous schools as a part of this (Lijphart 260). Bieber notes Belgian cultural autonomy's ability to decrease secessionist tendencies, to improve co-existence in multiethnic territories, and to "offer rights to groups in areas where it would be highly unlikely for them ever to be able to achieve territorial autonomy" (Bieber 91). Subatra Mitra claims that the federal "three language formula" has been an important step for cultural autonomy in India (56). Hindi and English are enforced as the two national languages, but local languages are additionally given regional political recognition (Mitra 56). The influence of the Bharatiya Janata Party has ensured the dominance of the Hindi language, but Mitra suggests that regional language recognition may satisfy regionalist sentiment (Mitra 58). In this way, individuals maintain both national and sub-national identities, provided for by central-regional cooperation.

Mitra's analysis is contradicted by Steven Ian Wilkinson's research into Indian language policy. Wilkinson notes that when the state of Uttar Pradesh announced that Urdu would be introduced as a new official language, anti-Muslim riots resulted in 26 deaths and 200 injuries (789). In Karnataka, the announcement of a new Urdu news program led to the death of 25 people, and "caused the broadcast to be quickly withdrawn" (Wilkinson 790). Wilkinson concludes that such measures may not always ease ethnic tensions, and may actually exacerbate them.

Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr. and Robert J. Thompson introduce further evidence of the failures of cultural autonomy. They cite Canada's 1969 Official Language Act, which gave equal recognition to both English and French, or Belgium's division of "administrative facilities in sensitive areas" for Dutch and French speakers (Rudolph and Thompson 301). According to them, neither of these policies stymied "ethnoterritorial sentiment" (and actually increased it for other ethnoterritorial groups), which they distinguish from ethnoterritorial parties (Rudolph and Thompson).

Regarding electoral success, Rudolph and Thompson argue that consociational accommodations made by the center lead to the "declining political strength" of ethnoterritorial parties (300). For example, they relate the Scottish National Party's "tacit support for the British Labour government between 1974 and 1979 in return for the latter's support for devolution" with the party's decline in electoral support in general elections and during the 1979 devolution referendum (Rudolph and Thompson 295, 301). While this is most certainly true, the picture looks very different today. Scotland now has a devolved Parliament, and the failure of Scotland's 2014 independence referendum did not negatively affect the SNP's general election performance; they are now the third largest party in the House of Commons. Though Bieber argued in 1999

that Belgian consociationalism was essential for cooperation between Flanders and Wallonia, Flemish separatists now constitute the largest party in the Belgian parliament.

Gordon E. Cannon's case study of Canada demonstrates that symmetric power-sharing may be less effective at quelling regional autonomist movements than asymmetric majoritarian systems. After 1960, historically agrarian Quebec began to modernize and Canada became "semi-consociational" as the French-speaking elite negotiated with the dominant English-speaking Canadian elite (Cannon 59-60). By 1968, the Quebec elite split into "separatist and federalist factions," and in 1976 the separatist Parti Quebecois rose to power (Cannon 60-61).

Prior to this, during the period from 1867 to 1960 in which "[Canadian] English subculture penetrated the [Canadian] French subculture through economic domination," the agrarian Quebecois remained "politically inert" and subordinate to the English-speakers (Cannon 57, 59). Cannon claims that this period "closely resemble[d] the *control model* [emphasis added]" outlined by Ian Lustick, who argues that stability can be achieved in deeply divided states if one group dominates the other (Cannon 55, Lustick 330). With tension surrounding the question of a "continued existence of a united polity," Cannon concludes that there was greater stability during this control period than during the following partially consociational arrangement (61).

The only thing that is clear about consociationalism is that its effect on autonomist movements is not clear. I believe that the relationship between consociational policies and electoral support for separatist and ethnonationalist parties is an area that requires more scrutiny.

### **Variables of Interest**

Let us now depart from a broad view of the literature on consociationalism and toward a pointed discussion of specific consociational variables. In his seminal work, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Lijphart outlines ten characteristics that differentiate majoritarian democracies from consensus-based (consociational) democracies. For the purposes of this study, I examine three of these variables which are most pertinent to the electoral success of separatist parties: **A) majoritarianism/pluralitarianism** versus *proportional representation*, **B) unitary governments** versus *federal governments*, and **C) presidential systems** versus *parliamentary systems* (Lijphart, "Patterns" 3). In all three of the aforementioned dichotomies, the latter characteristics are representative of consociational arrangements. I also examine the effect of societal cleavages, a non-governmental variable, in order to determine if the level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization contributes to separatist party formation and success.

### *Proportional Representation*

Lijphart reminds us that majoritarian electoral systems with single-member districts "are likely to have two-party systems, one-party governments, and executives that are dominant in relation to their legislatures" (Lijphart, "Constitutional" 72-23). As such, we can logically expect that ethnic and regional parties will be much weaker or nonexistent in these systems due to a lack of widespread appeal that is necessary in order to gain electoral viability. On the other hand, "where ethnic minorities have formed ethnic political parties...PR has enabled them to gain virtually perfect proportional representation," such as in the cases of Belgium and Bosnia (Lijphart, "Constitutional" 77). Again, following basic reasoning, if systems of proportional representation increase the viability of ethnic parties, then they likely also increase the viability of radical and separatist parties because of the reduced threshold for achieving electoral success.



However, John D. Huber's research suggests that there is actually a negative relationship between proportional representation and the politicization of ethnicity. His basic conclusion is that "voters have other interests or identities that are equally or more important" than ethnicity, and that because proportional representation makes it easier to form viable parties, "voters from the same group often divide their support across a number of parties" which may or may not be based on ethnicity (Huber 1000). Huber cites the Catalans of Spain as an example, as a 2004 survey revealed that Catalan voters split their support between two ethnic parties-- one of which supported Catalan independence and one of which opposed it-- as well as other non-ethnic parties (999). Further, he makes the argument that "in majoritarian systems with geographically dispersed groups, there can be strong incentives for a minority group to vote together...in an effort to become pivotal in determining election outcomes," such as is the case with black voters' overwhelming support for the Democratic Party in the United States (Huber 999). In essence, his research suggests the opposite of what is commonly assumed. Majoritarian systems may increase the political salience of ethnic appeals, because minority groups feel pressured to vote as a singular bloc in order to be an effective political force.

### *Federalism*

According to Lijphart, federal arrangements have the benefit of "giving autonomy to ethnic minorities" by creating decentralized provincial governments ("Patterns" 195). In some consociational systems, subnational political units are created to coincide with social boundaries between minority groups, which "can make a plural society less plural by creating relatively homogeneous smaller areas" (Lijphart, "Patterns" 196). Lijphart believes that federal policies

have benefited very pluralistic places such as India, a country with extreme linguistic diversity. As previously mentioned, India's federal system recognizes the many languages within its provinces, "making languages 'a cementing and integrating influence' instead of a 'force for division'," and ideally promoting harmony between the many groups (Kothari qtd. in Lijphart, "Patterns" 197).

Henry E. Hale suggests that this analysis may be too simplistic. Hale asserts that the effect of ethnofederalism is more nuanced and its relation to interethnic conflict is dependent on how subnational units are divided. His research focuses on "core ethnic regions" that contain "either an outright majority of the population or...at least 20 percent more of the whole country's population than...the second largest region," the presence of which contribute to the collapse of ethnofederal states (Hale 169). The governments of these core ethnic regions can convince their constituents that "the core ethnic group can exist apart politically from other sections of the country" and therefore can "potentially organize a rival claim to sovereignty," pitting national and subnational units against one another (Hale 173, 175). Consequently, in countries without core ethnic regions, it is more difficult for ethnonationalists to present a competing claim for the sovereignty over an ethnic group or a region. With a greater number of smaller subnational governments, it naturally becomes more costly to create a nationalist movement that "weaves together many separate regional administrative structures" (Hale 178).

Indeed, the data show that states with core ethnic regions may be more prone to instability. Hale's study of twenty-eight ethnofederal states reveals that seven out of fourteen states that contained core ethnic regions collapsed (181). None of the ethnofederal states without core ethnic regions collapsed (Hale 181). My study does not include core ethnic regions as an

input variable because it examines both federal and unitary states, but I do evaluate this concept in my analysis.

### *Parliamentary Government*

On the whole, Lijphart endorses parliamentary executives as being better for power-sharing in divided societies. Because presidential systems invest executive power in a single individual, "[a] president almost inevitably belongs to one ethnic group" and the dominance of the president seems to preclude the inclusion of minorities in executive decision-making (Lijphart, "Constitutional" 81). Parliamentary systems necessarily require "conciliation and compromise" when coalitions must be formed in order to form a government, and therefore it behooves members of parliament to strive for "the greatest possible inclusion of representatives of [minority] groups in the decision-making process" for the sake of having a stable and unified government (Lijphart, "Constitutional" 81). Yet Lijphart notes that this is not always true, and cites Westminster-style systems with a "majority ethnic group" as an exception ("Constitutional" 81).

In his criticism of parliamentary systems, R. Kent Weaver claims that because "party unity is required to keep the government in power from falling," regions that primarily support an opposition party "will be virtually shut out of government" (22). It is simply the nature of parliamentary systems that a majority controls all decision-making, and that the opposition has no role in governance. In Canada, the inability of Québécois legislators to articulate regional interests has created "increased pressure for the devolution of power" and has encouraged party leaders "to take a hostile stance toward the national government in order to prove their credentials as regional loyalists," because they cannot prove their credentials through

participation in the national government (Weaver 23). The endorsement of full-blown separatism by Quebec's regional party lends more credence to Weaver's criticism. Weaver does clarify that there is one conditional element to this problem: countries with single-member districts are more likely to face this issue (22).

### *Societal Cleavages*

Outside of state policies, Lijphart admits that one threat to the success of consociationalism is the lack of multiple cleavages within majority groups. In India, Hindus constitute about 83% of the population, but are "so thoroughly divided by language, caste, and sect that they do not form a political majority," which allows for functional power-sharing arrangements (Lijphart, "Puzzle" 261). Indeed, Bieber also acknowledges that internal divisions within Flemish and Walloons force coalition-making between the various identity groups (Bieber 85). The Belgian party system contains three main parties at the highest level, but is structured along regional, linguistic, and religious lines; internal divisions and coalition-making mean that it is actually an eight-party system (Bieber 86). Bosnian parties, on the other hand, are defined primarily by "national criteria," and thus ethnic groups are pitted against one another instead of working together (Bieber 86). Thus far, it appears that significant internal cleavages do benefit the stability of deeply divided states by diluting potential majorities.

However, Steven Ian Wilkinson takes issue with this notion. Wilkinson demonstrates that since India has become increasingly consociational since the 1960s, incidents of "Hindu-Muslim riots, caste conflict, and separatist violence" have risen (771). He claims that power-sharing incites action by "groups excluded from ethnic quotas...and from... groups who argue that they constitute a separate ethnic group that deserves its own benefits"; in essence, implementing consociationalism may encourage groups to exploit the system (Wilkinson 771). Indian ethnic

leaders "[worry]...that members of their own group will vote along non-ethnic lines or for a party that represents a competing ethnic identity...[and] frequently try to incite ethnic violence...to deal with such defections and with rising political mobilization by subordinate members of their own group" (Wilkinson 788). Even Lijphart acknowledges that too many groups can make political cooperation difficult, and admits that India "receives an unfavorable rating" due to this ("Puzzle" 263). Ultimately, it is not clear whether more cleavages increase or decrease ethnonational sentiment in deeply divided states.

### **Research Design**

The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not power-sharing significantly affects the strength of separatism in terms of electoral mobilization. I compare 157 states, each of which has a combination of the variables of interest discussed in the previous section. My research and analysis is based on Charles Ragin's qualitative Boolean method, which allows me to compare country-cases as configurations of dummy variables. The advantage of this approach is that it values "macrosocial units" and allows for "comparing wholes as configurations of parts" (Ragin 5, 84). In this study, the central goal is a comparison of different configurations of characteristics of various states. These states exist as distinct groups, and it is insufficient to merely observe the variables cross-nationally without any regard for the distinction of states as macrosocial units.

The four independent variables in this study are coded as either 0 or 1 based on their presence or absence within a given country-case. Each variable will also be tied to letter, which will be shown as uppercase if the condition is present in the country-case, and lowercase if it is absent. To reiterate, the independent variables include:

1. *Proportional representation* [A] (presence) versus *majority/plurality/other* [a] (absence)
2. *Federal* [B] (presence) versus *unitary* [b] (absence)
3. *Parliamentary system* [C] (presence) versus *presidential/other system* [c] (absence)
4. *Major social cleavages* [D] (presence) versus *minor social cleavages* [d] (absence)

Variable (A) represents the presence of a system of proportional representation. In states with proportional representation, electoral districts have a number of seats that are distributed to parties based on the percentage of the votes that they receive. This is in contrast to majoritarian or pluralitarian electoral systems based on single-member districts, in which only the party or candidate that receives the most votes will represent that district. There are variations on both of these methods, but these mixed electoral systems will also be categorized alongside majoritarian systems for the purposes of Boolean coding. Information regarding electoral systems was gathered from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance website ([www.idea.int](http://www.idea.int)).

Variable (B) represents the presence of a federal system of government. Federalism is based on the principle of decentralizing powers from the national government to provincial governments. The United States, which divides political power between the federal government and the fifty states, is the most notable example of federalism. In unitary states, power is concentrated in the hands of the national government. There may be local or regional governments in unitary systems, but they are ultimately subordinate and beholden to the center. The Forum of Federations website was used to determine which states are federal ([www.forumfed.org](http://www.forumfed.org)).

Variable (C) represents the presence of a parliamentary system of government. In parliamentary systems of government, the Prime Minister is a member of the legislature and is selected to serve as the executive by other members of parliament. In presidential systems, voters directly elect the President, who leads an executive branch which is separate from the legislature. There are many other differences between the systems, but this is the primary distinction. The classic example of a parliamentary system of government is the United Kingdom, whose Westminster system has been replicated in many democratic states, and the United States' presidential system is the inspiration for most presidential systems around the world. Alternative systems will be included alongside presidential systems for the purpose of Boolean coding. Data on parliamentary and presidential systems of government was gathered from the McGill University website ([www.cs.mcgill.ca](http://www.cs.mcgill.ca)).

Additionally, the non-policy variable (D) will represent the presence of major social cleavages. This will be represented by a 1985 ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index from UC San Diego professor Philip G. Roeder's website (<http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm>). This scale represents how likely it would be for two randomly selected individuals in a certain country to be from the same ethnic and/or linguistic group. Lower scores indicate less fractionalization, with "0" meaning total homogeneity. Higher scores indicate more fractionalization, with "1" being the highest score. The purpose of including this is to determine if and how the number and sizes of ethnolinguistic groups affect support for separatism. States without available ELF data are not included, as one cannot properly compare and analyze if some cases are missing entire variables.

For this study's Boolean analysis, scores of 0.5 or higher will represent the presence of significant fractionalization. This may seem like an arbitrary cutoff, but any scientific study

includes thresholds and cutoffs that could be considered arbitrary. It is necessary to impose some sort of limitations on an empirical study in order to be able to draw meaningful and concise conclusions. Additionally, the distribution of ELF scores does not seem to be skewed towards either extreme, meaning that a cutoff of 0.5 serves as a solid median.

The dependent variable will measure electoral support for separatist movements. Separatist movements will be defined as ethnonationalist political parties that openly espouse the immediate or eventual separation of a specific region or cultural group from the rest of the state. It does not include political parties that merely represent a particular cultural group or demand federalism or autonomy within a particular existing state. Electoral support will be represented as the vote share of nationalist parties as a percentage in national legislative elections. Only the percentages for the lower chamber election will be represented if the legislature is bicameral. These vote shares will cover the two most recent election cycles in each country.

Electoral data will be gathered from Adam Carr's Election Archive, the European Election Database, ElectionGuide.org (published by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems), and the Inter-Parliamentary Union's election database. The past two election cycles have been documented for each of the 157 states. Electoral data may be limited due to some parties potentially not being listed by the databases, or a lack of available information about listed parties.

### **Data Analysis**

<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>C</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>Total Instances</b>	<b>Instances of Separatists</b>
0	0	0	0	22	1
0	0	0	1	27	0
0	0	1	0	17	1



0	0	1	1	6	0
0	1	0	0	2	0
0	1	0	1	5	1
0	1	1	0	2	1
0	1	1	1	5	2
1	0	0	0	14	0
1	0	0	1	19	0
1	0	1	0	23	2
1	0	1	1	6	0
1	1	0	0	2	0
1	1	0	1	3	1
1	1	1	0	3	1
1	1	1	1	2	2

Above is the truth table which shows the distribution of cases based on their Boolean values. Out of the 157 democratic or semi-democratic states that were evaluated, only twelve of them had visible separatist parties: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Italy, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, and the United Kingdom. A full dataset can be found at the end of this document. It is very possible that there are other states with separatist political parties competing in national elections, but the sources that were consulted merely do not have enough information about some elections. This is especially true for smaller and less developed countries. It's not a particularly major concern, because separatist parties that were missed by this study likely have very little support, and their lack of visibility does not hinder the empirical analysis.

Country	Primitive Expression	Election 1	Election 2
Belgium	ABCD	23.93%(2014)	23.7%(2010)
Bosnia	ABCD	14.32%(2014)	16.7%(2010)
Canada	aBCD	4.7% (2015)	6.02%(2011)
Czech Rep.	AbCD	0% (2013)	0.23%(2010)
France	abcd	0.6%(2012)	0.52%(2007)
Germany	aBCd	0.1%(2013)	0.1%(2009)

India	aBCD	0.07% (2014)	0.12%(2009)
Italy	AbCd	0.44%(2013)	0.25%(2008)
S. Africa	ABcD	0.93%(2014)	0.83%(2009)
Spain	ABCd	6.93% (2015)	8.75%(2011)
Sudan	aBcD	0% (2015)	22% <sup>1</sup> (2010)
U.K.	abCd	4.74%(2015)	1.9%(2010)

The primitive expressions can be represented as a Boolean equation, where (S) represents the presence of electoral support for separatist parties:

$$S = abcd + abCd + aBcD + aBCd + aBCD + AbCd + ABcD + ABCd + ABCD$$

These primitive expressions can be further simplified in order to discover the most significant variable combinations. If two primitive expressions with the same output have all but one variable in common, the differing variable can be removed. With this method I can minimize the expressions and find the prime implicants, which will aid my qualitative analysis.

The minimized equation is presented below:

$$S = abd + BC + BD + Cd$$

According to this reduced equation, separatist electoral support results in four circumstances:

- 1) Majoritarian unitary states with minor social cleavages
- 2) Federal parliamentary states
- 3) Federal states with major social cleavages
- 4) Parliamentary states with minor social cleavages

Proportional representation does not appear to be strongly correlated with support for ethnonational separatist parties. This lends credence to Huber's suggestion that majoritarian

<sup>1</sup> Sudan's percentage represents the percentage of seats in the legislature, not the percentage of votes cast for the separatist party. Data about the latter is unavailable.

systems may actually be more likely to spawn ethnonationalist parties, due to a pressure to vote as a unified bloc in order to be an effective political force under systems of majority and plurality (999-1000). The ability of proportional representation to allow a greater number of viable parties may have a balancing effect. Ethnonationalist parties can become viable in these systems, but so can many other types of parties based on a wide variety of appeals. Ethnonational identity is not inherently a stronger form of identity than others. There are many potential affiliations that voters may prefer to associate with, including religion, social class, caste, environmentalism, and others.

Federalism appears to be a significant contributor to separatist support in combination with parliamentary systems of government or in societies with significant social cleavages. I will now refer back to Hale's argument that "core ethnic regions" in federal states contribute to interethnic conflict and collapse of ethnofederal states because they can challenge the center's claim to sovereignty over that territory. To reiterate, a core ethnic region is a subnational province that contains "either an outright majority of the population or...at least 20 percent more of the whole country's population than...the second largest region" (Hale 169). Of the eight federal states in which there was visible support for separatist parties, six of them have core ethnic regions: Belgium, Bosnia, Canada, Germany, India, and Sudan. Only South Africa and Spain do not have core ethnic regions. This is a very interesting discovery, and suggests that this concept should be explored further in future research that concerns federalism and ethnonationalism.

Hale's analysis of ethnofederalism can be synthesized with Weaver's criticism of parliamentary systems for exacerbating regionalist sentiment and Wilkinson's warning that more social cleavages can produce increased ethnonationalism (Weaver 22-23, Wilkinson 788).

Because opposition parties supported by certain regions have no participation in national politics, the added imbalance created by the presence of a core ethnic region may further alienate minority groups. The combination of a core ethnic region and major social cleavages could potentially create a perception in the minds of minority voters that they are the subjects of exploitation or are being treated as subordinate in comparison to the majority or plurality group.

The last variable combination (Cd) reiterates Weaver's criticism, but now also may confirm Lijphart and Bieber's argument that a greater number of social cleavages dilutes ethnonationalist appeals. These scholars claim that, by offering alternative affiliations, increased ethnolinguistic fractionalization hinders the consolidation of more monolithic ethnic groups as political actors (Lijphart, "Puzzle" 261, Bieber 85-86). Therefore, one can imagine a situation in which regionalists become radicalized because they have been shut out of government, and the reduced number of social cleavages removes barriers that would otherwise hinder ethnonationalist groups from forming.

### **Absent Separatist Parties**

There were also three primitive expressions from the table on page 15 that are strongly correlated with an absence of successful separatist parties. I chose three Boolean codes for which there were over ten corresponding countries. There are several other primitive expressions that also did not correspond to any of the countries displaying successful separatist parties in the past two election cycles, but I chose the following three because they all include a relatively high number of cases, which will make my empirical conclusions more robust.

$$s = abcD + Abcd + AbcD$$

The first primitive expression represents 27 cases, the second represents 14 cases, and the last represents 19, for a combined total of 60 cases. Below are the prime implicants derived from this expression.

$$s = bcD + Abc$$

According to this reduced equation, a lack of separatist electoral support results from two circumstances:

- 1) Unitary presidential states with significant ethnolinguistic fractionalization
- 2) Unitary presidential states with proportional representation

The clear point of observation here is that unitary and presidential states are least likely to produce separatist political parties. Unit states may make it difficult to organize a regional movement, because the lack of provincial governmental autonomy discourages opinions that a region could become a viable independent state. The legislative dynamics of a presidential system may also discourage separatist party formation because legislative members from a party outside of the government have a greater ability to participate in the political process compared to a parliamentary system in which the government has total control. Additionally, the prominence of the executive in a presidential system may discourage some radical party formation, because ultimately only *one* candidate will win and therefore it behooves potential radical political actors to cooperate with moderates in order to elect the "lesser evil." Finally, the a unitary presidential state with major fractionalization that does not produce separatist support lends further credence to Bieber's argument that high fractionalization may reduce the viability of ethnonationalist movements due to a greater number of identity groups competing for loyalty.

## Conclusion and Limitations

It is important to remember that this study is solely concerned with separatist *political parties*. I do not attempt to draw any conclusions about separatist organizations such as interest groups and militias. Nor do I claim to make any definitive statements about separatist *movements* on the whole.

Separatist political parties, from what this study has demonstrated, appear only in very specific circumstances. Eight of the twelve countries in which there was electoral support for separatist parties are European. With the exceptions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Africa, and Sudan, all of the countries in which there was support for separatist parties are high-functioning democracies. Therefore, from the empirical findings of this study, I cannot draw any global conclusions about the performance of separatist parties. The level of development of political and electoral provisions, a condition not addressed by this study, likely can affect party formation to a significant degree.

Further, the inclusion of Bosnia and Sudan should be regarded with some caution. I believe that removing them entirely from this study would potentially limit my analysis, but I also believe that it is my responsibility to inform the reader that both of these countries are peculiar cases. Their electoral results are heavily influenced by the end of major wars and the involvement of the international community. Bosnia's electoral system was heavily influenced by outside forces after the signing of the Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnian War. Similarly, the success of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in the 2010 elections preceded the independence of South Sudan in 2011.

These two facts may warrant their exclusion in the opinion of some. I personally believe that their inclusion is appropriate, because this study simply does not analyze the influence of wars or the international community. However, I would like to see a future study of separatist movements that does consider both of those factors as variables.

The findings suggest that some of the attributes of consociational systems are present in states where separatist parties find support, there is not strong evidence that consociationalism as a whole is correlated with greater separatist electoral support. In fact, there is evidence that the presence of majoritarian characteristics can just as easily contribute to separatist mobilization. The level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization also varies considerably when examining its effect on support for separatism. In some cases high levels of fragmentation may aid separatist appeals, and in some cases it may hinder it. I would caution against any hasty generalizations especially because visible separatist support was only present in a small number of cases compared to the sample size.

There are very likely additional reasons for a lack of separatist support in many countries that extend beyond the variables included in this study. For example, some states may outlaw separatist parties may blatantly outlaw all separatist political parties. This would represent a visible mechanism that stymies separatist support. On the other hand, other states may not ban separatist parties outright, but may persecute members of these potential parties, or block their progress to becoming a legitimate party through bureaucratic means. It is important that this study is not trying to determine all of the factors that contribute to the support or lack of support for separatism. Instead, I merely hope to evaluate the degree to which political separatists are successful based on electoral and political structures.

Future studies may wish to include more variables, particularly some of the other ten consociational characteristics outlined by Lijphart. An extended timeline that examines historical elections may also provide further insight. I would also like to see a comparison between elections on the provincial level and elections on the national level to determine whether the variables in this study have a more apparent impact at the regional level.

Most significantly, the effect of fractionalization on the formation of not only separatist parties, but ethnonationalist parties in general, needs much more research. In this study I only considered one form of social cleavages, in the form of ethnicity and language. Future studies should also examine the role of religion, class, and gender. I would also encourage the creation of a suitable index that includes all five of these cleavages.

Finally, it might be worthwhile to change the focus from purely separatist political parties (ie: groups that want a sovereign state) to those who want more power for their regions within the existing political system. In the course of my research, I discovered many parties that were heavily nationalistic and desired more regional autonomy, but did not declare their desire for an independent state. I do not think that this is would stray too far from the original design of this study, because as was seen during the breakup of Yugoslavia, the simple devolution of power can contribute to the future success of secessionist militias and politicians.



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Country	Electoral System Family	Federal or Unitary	Executive-Legislative Relations	Frac #	P - R - A	Fed - B	Par - C	Frac - D	Boolean	Separatist Support 1	Se Su
Afghanistan	Other	Unitary	Presidential	0.67	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2010)	0%
Albania	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.06	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0% (2013)	0%
Algeria	PR	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.3	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0% (2012)	0%
Angola	PR	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.78	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2012)	0%
Argentina	PR	Federal	Presidential	0.29	1	1	0	0	ABcd	0% (2015)	0%
Armenia	Mixed	Unitary	Presidential	0.13	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2012)	0%
Australia	Plurality/Majority	Federal	Parliamentary	0.44	0	1	1	0	aBCd	0% (2013)	0%
Austria	PR	Federal	Parliamentary	0.15	1	1	1	0	ABCd	0% (2013)	0%
Azerbaijan	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.31	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2015)	0%
Bahamas	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.41	0	0	1	0	abCd	0% (2012)	0%
Bahrain	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.5	0	0	1	1	abCD	0% (2014)	0%
Bangladesh	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.04	0	0	1	0	abCd	0% (2014)	0%

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Barbados	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.08	0	0	1	0	abCd	0% (2013)	0%
Belarus	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.37	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2012)	0%
Belgium*	PR	Federal	Parliamentary	0.59	1	1	1	1	ABCD	23.93%(2014)	23.93%
Benin	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.53	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2015)	0%
Bhutan	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.56	0	0	1	1	abCD	0% (2013)	0%
Bolivia	Mixed	Unitary	Presidential	0.74	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2014)	0%
Bosnia and H.*	PR	Federal	Parliamentary	0.7	1	1	1	1	ABCD	14.32%(2014)	16.32%
Botswana	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.4	0	0	1	0	abCd	0% (2014)	0%
Brazil	PR	Federal	Presidential	0.58	1	1	0	1	ABcD	0% (2014)	0%
Bulgaria	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.23	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0% (2014)	0%
Burkina Faso	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.71	1	0	1	1	AbCD	0% (2015)	0%
Burundi	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.31	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0% (2015)	0%
Cambodia	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.24	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0% (2013)	0%
Cameroon	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.88	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2013)	0%
Canada*	Plurality/Majority	Federal	Parliamentary	0.77	0	1	1	1	aBCD	4.7% (2015)	6.0%
Cape Verde	PR	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.55	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2011)	0%
Central African R.	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.83	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2011)	0%
Chad	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.86	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2011)	0%
Chile	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.52	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2013)	0%
Colombia	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.6	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2014)	0%
Comoros	Plurality/Majority	Federal	Presidential	0.08	0	1	0	0	aBcd	0% (2015)	0%
Congo, DR	Mixed	Unitary	Presidential	0.9	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2011)	0%
Costa Rica	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.46	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0%(2014)	0%
Croatia	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.42	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0% (2015)	0%
Cyprus	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.33	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0% (2011)	0%
Czech Republic*	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.11	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0% (2013)	0.2%
Côte d'Ivoire	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.9	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2011)	0%
Denmark	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.06	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0% (2015)	0%

Djibouti	Mixed	Unitary	Presidential	0.71	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2013)	0%
Dominican Republic	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.48	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0% (2010)	0%
Ecuador	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.66	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2013)	0%
Egypt	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.03	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2015)	0%
El Salvador	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.16	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2015)	0%
Equatorial Guinea	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.47	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0% (2013)	0%
Estonia	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.53	1	0	1	1	AbCD	0% (2015)	0%
Ethiopia	Plurality/Majority	Federal	Parliamentary	0.77	0	1	1	1	aBCD	0% (2015)	0%
Fiji	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.68	1	0	1	1	AbCD	0% (2014)	0%
Finland	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.13	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0% (2015)	0%
France*	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.32	0	0	0	0	abcd	0.6%(2012)	0.5%
Gabon	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.81	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2011)	0%
Gambia	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.72	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2012)	0%
Georgia	Mixed	Unitary	Presidential	0.49	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2012)	0%
Germany*	Mixed	Federal	Parliamentary	0.11	0	1	1	0	aBCd	0.1%(2013)	0.1%
Ghana	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.87	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2012)	0%
Greece	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.09	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0%(2015)	0%
Guatemala	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.76	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2015)	0%
Guinea	Mixed	Unitary	Presidential	0.75	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2013)	0%
Guinea-Bissau	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.78	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2014)	0%
Guyana	PR	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.57	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2015)	0%
Haiti	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.01	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2015)	0%
Honduras	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.12	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0% (2013)	0%
Hungary	Mixed	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.01	0	0	1	0	abCd	0% (2014)	0%
Iceland	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.03	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0%(2013)	0%
India*	Plurality/Majority	Federal	Parliamentary	0.88	0	1	1	1	aBCD	0.07% (2014)	0.1%
Indonesia	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.76	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2014)	0%
Iran	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Theocracy	0.75	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2016)	0%
Iraq	PR	Federal	Parliamentary	0.38	1	1	1	0	ABCd	0% (2014)	0%
Ireland	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.03	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0%(2016)	0%
Israel	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.29	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0%(2015)	0%
Italy*	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.11	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0.44%(2013)	0.2%

Jamaica	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.42	0	0	1	0	abCd	0%(2011)	0%
Japan	Mixed	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.01	0	0	1	0	abCd	0%(2014)	0%
Jordan	Mixed	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.46	0	0	1	0	abCd	0% (2013)	0%
Kazakhstan	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.69	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2012)	0%
Kenya	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.88	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2013)	0%
Korea, Republic of	Mixed	Unitary	Presidential	0	0	0	0	0	abcd	0%(2012)	0%
Kuwait	Other	Unitary	Con. Monarchy	0.79	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2013)	0%
Kyrgyzstan	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.66	1	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2015)	0%
Latvia	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.61	1	0	1	1	AbCD	0% (2014)	0%
Lebanon	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.36	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2009)	0%
Lesotho	Mixed	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.22	0	0	1	0	abCd	0% (2015)	0%
Liberia	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.9	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2014)	0%
Libya	Mixed	Unitary	Transitional	0.27	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2014)	0%
Lithuania	Mixed	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.35	0	0	1	0	abCd	0% (2012)	0%
Luxembourg	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.43	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0%(2013)	0%
Macedonia	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.51	1	0	1	1	AbCD	0% (2014)	0%
Madagascar	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.87	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2013)	0%
Malawi	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.61	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2014)	0%
Malaysia	Plurality/Majority	Federal	Parliamentary	0.72	0	1	1	1	aBCD	0%(2013)	0%
Maldives	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2014)	0%
Mali	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.83	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2013)	0%
Malta	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.07	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0% (2013)	0%
Mauritania	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.32	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2013)	0%
Mauritius	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.49	0	0	1	0	abCd	0%(2014)	0%
Mexico	Mixed	Federal	Presidential	0.22	0	1	0	0	aBcd	0% (2012)	0%
Moldova	PR	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.55	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2014)	0%
Mongolia	Mixed	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.35	0	0	1	0	abCd	0% (2012)	0%
Morocco	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.4	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0% (2011)	0%
Mozambique	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.7	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2014)	0%
Myanmar	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.42	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2015)	0%

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Namibia	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.72	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2014)	0%
Nepal	Mixed	Federal	Parliamentary	0.66	0	1	1	1	aBCD	0% (2013)	0%
Netherlands	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.35	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0%(2012)	0%
New Zealand	Mixed	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.42	0	0	1	0	abCd	0%(2014)	0%
Nicaragua	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.39	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0% (2011)	0%
Niger	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.68	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2016)	0%
Nigeria	Plurality/Majority	Federal	Presidential	0.86	0	1	0	1	aBcD	0% (2015)	0%
Norway	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.06	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0%(2013)	0%
Oman	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Monarchy	0.14	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2015)	0%
Pakistan	Mixed	Federal	Semi-presidential	0.54	0	1	0	1	aBcD	0% (2013)	0%
Panama	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.48	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0% (2014)	0%
Papua New Guinea	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.98	0	0	1	1	abCD	0% (2012)	0%
Paraguay	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.18	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0% (2013)	0%
Peru	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.51	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2011)	0%
Philippines	Mixed	Unitary	Presidential	0.86	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2013)	0%
Poland	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.04	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0% (2015)	0%
Portugal	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.01	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0%(2015)	0%
Republic of The Congo	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.68	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2012)	0%
Romania	Mixed	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.21	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2012)	0%
Russia	PR	Federal	Semi-presidential	0.33	1	1	0	0	ABcd	0% (2011)	0%
Rwanda	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.26	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0% (2013)	0%
Samoa	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.04	0	0	1	0	abCd	0% (2016)	0%
Senegal	Mixed	Unitary	Presidential	0.79	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2012)	0%
Sierra Leone	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.77	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2012)	0%
Singapore	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.4	0	0	1	0	abCd	0% (2015)	0%
Slovakia	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.24	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0% (2016)	0%
Slovenia	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.18	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0% (2014)	0%
Solomon Islands	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.95	0	0	1	1	abCD	0% (2014)	0%
South Africa*	PR	Federal	Semi-presidential	0.89	1	1	0	1	ABcD	0.93% (2014)	0.8%
Spain*	PR	Federal	Parliamentary	0.46	1	1	1	0	ABCd	6.93% (2015)	8.7%

Sri Lanka	PR	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.42	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0% (2015)	0%
Sudan*	Mixed	Federal	Presidential	0.73	0	1	0	1	aBcD	0% (2015)	0%
Suriname	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.73	1	0	1	1	AbCD	0% (2015)	0%
Swaziland	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Monarchy	0.27	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2013)	0%
Sweden	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.14	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0%(2014)	0%
Switzerland	PR	Federal	Directorial	0.59	1	1	0	1	ABcD	0%(2015)	0%
Taiwan	Mixed	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.27	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2012)	0%
Tajikistan	Mixed	Unitary	Presidential	0.55	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2015)	0%
Tanzania	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.92	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2015)	0%
Thailand	In transition	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.63	0	0	1	1	abCD	0% (2011)	0%
Togo	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.71	1	0	0	1	AbcD	0% (2013)	0%
Trinidad and Tobago	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.64	0	0	1	1	abCD	0% (2015)	0%
Tunisia	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.05	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0% (2014)	0%
Turkey	PR	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.26	1	0	1	0	AbCd	0% (2015)	0%
Turkmenistan	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.46	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2013)	0%
Uganda	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.92	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2016)	0%
Ukraine	Mixed	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.42	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2014)	0%
United Kingdom*	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.39	0	0	1	0	abCd	4.74%(2015)	1.9%
United States	Plurality/Majority	Federal	Presidential	0.58	0	1	0	1	aBcD	0%(2014)	0%
Uruguay	PR	Unitary	Presidential	0.38	1	0	0	0	Abcd	0%(2014)	0%
Uzbekistan	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.48	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2014)	0%
Vanuatu	Other	Unitary	Parliamentary	0.34	0	0	1	0	abCd	0% (2012)	0%
Venezuela	Mixed	Federal	Presidential	0.52	0	1	0	1	aBcD	0% (2015)	0%
Yemen	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Semi-presidential	0.05	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2003)	0%
Zambia	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.81	0	0	0	1	abcD	0% (2011)	0%
Zimbabwe	Plurality/Majority	Unitary	Presidential	0.47	0	0	0	0	abcd	0% (2013)	0%



