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James V. Spickard
University of Redlands

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DIVERSITY VS PLURALISM?

NOTES FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

James V. Spickard
University of Redlands*

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edited by Enzo Pace and Giuseppe Giordan


* Please address all correspondence to the author at: jim_spickard@redlands.edu
Europe seems newly awash in a discourse of “pluralism”. Long seen as a White, Christian continent—ignore Germany’s ‘Turks’, France’s banlieues, Spain’s Moorish heritage, the Jews, and the Roma—Europe seems to have shifted ethnically and religiously in recent decades. The continent that produced the Westphalian state system as a way to institutionalize religious homogeneity (cuius region eius religio) now confronts newcomers who don’t fit the old mold. Cross-border migration has made hash of the 19th-century nationalist idea that each ‘people’ has ‘one language’, ‘one history’, ‘one phenotype’, and ‘one culture’ and thus deserves one state (Anderson 1983). Religious and ethnic diversity is on the rise. How to reconceptualize Europe becomes a crisis of the first order.

The title of this volume gives us some avenues of understanding, most notably “diversity” and “pluralism”. These boast many definitions, but we can do worse than begin with a distinction posed by Professor Diana Eck, the Director of Harvard University’s “Pluralism Project”. That project’s website quotes her as follows: “Diversity is just plurality, plain and simple—splendid, colorful, perhaps threatening.” “Pluralism”, on the other hand, involves an “energetic engagement with diversity”. It is more than just tolerance of others, but “the active seeking of understanding across lines of difference”. It is, Eck writes, “the encounter of commitments, based on dialogue” (Pluralism Project 1). Put more simply, diversity is a brute fact, while pluralism takes work. It is, indeed, an accomplishment: an accomplishment of communication.

Eck points out that diversity and pluralism have different policy implications. “Diversity can and has meant the creation of religious ghettos with little traffic between or among them” (Pluralism Project 2). It has often meant exclusion: deliberate barriers erected against those whose religions or ethnicities differ from the local norm. Europe’s Jewish ghettos come
immediately to mind, but the United States has a similar history. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, augmented by the Immigration Act of 1924 served “to preserve the ideal of American homogeneity” (Office of the Historian) against an imagined onslaught of Chinese, Italians, Jews, Slavs, and so on. The objections were both ethnic and religious. Italians were shunned for their Catholicism, as the Irish had been sixty years earlier. Chinese were seen as a superstitious race, unable to rise to the level of native Protestant virtue (Spickard 2007; Nee & Nee 1973). Japanese (Buddhist, Shinto, and Christian) were famously herded into camps during World War II, something not done to America’s largely Christian German population. East Asians may now be our “model minority” (Petersen 1966), but they were long shunned.

There are other ways to handle diversity, of course, among them erasing it through assimilation; I shall return to this below. Eck, however, favors the pluralist option. As she described at length in her 2009 Gifford Lectures¹, pluralism seeks to turn diversity to humane uses. Rather than shunning or oppressing those unlike ourselves, we seek them out. We try to understand their humanity, in the hope that it will deepen our own. Diversity, says Eck, is inevitable in the contemporary world. The world is full of disparate peoples, now easier to encounter than ever before. We must, she says, let this unite us rather than divide us. We must get to know them, recognize them, appreciate their humanity and let them touch our lives. This is a fine moral project, and a democratic one. It is also a good deal less simple than meets even Eck’s experienced eye.

What can we learn about diversity and pluralism from the American religious and ethnic experiment of the last 200 years? That is my topic for this chapter.

A Nation of Immigrants

The United States is a notoriously diverse country, both ethically and religiously. It has never been resoundingly pluralist. We are known as “a nation of immigrants”—the title of a long pamphlet that future President John F. Kennedy wrote a few years before taking office. Its two
key words—“nation” and “immigrants”—imply a unity that has seldom been part of American practice. Our country has always welcomed immigrants but has also always tried to turn them into something else than they thought they were. As Jason DeParle (2011) recently described, the Virginia colony sought workers but turned them into slaves; Massachusetts sought religious believers but punished dissent; Pennsylvania sought citizens but got foreign enclaves—the Amish, Hutterites, and ‘Pennsylvania Dutch’ whose rural communities now attract tourists in droves.

Here’s how our national myth goes. It says that people come to the U.S. from all over the world and assimilate to become “Americans”. Never mind that over half of early-20th century Italian ‘immigrants’ returned home after making money—this being the point of their overseas adventure. Most Chinese intended the same, though their return was more hazardous, as was the racism they suffered. The same is true for many contemporary Mexican laborers: one can, for example, build a very nice house in the little town of Gomez Farias, Michoacán, on wages from American field labor. Yes, one has to endure hardship while doing so, but many find the trip to “Gold Mountain” worth the effort. Also never mind two centuries of anti-Catholic bigotry and even violence—broken only by John Kennedy’s election, toward which his own nation-of-immigrants mythologizing was aimed.

In the religious sphere, the myth takes a particular turn. In its vision, migrants start out immersed in the religions of their homelands—Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish, Buddhist, animist, or whatever. They move to the United States and gradually, over two or three generations, become American. This assimilation does not require that they give up their native religions. It does, however, ask those religions to become Americanized. Half a century ago, Will Herberg described this process in his famous book Protestant, Catholic, Jew (1955). There, he argued that American religions have become domesticated, torn from their historical and theological roots to become soft identities. To be a Jew in America, he said, or to be an American Catholic is to affirm a diffuse religious heritage, which one may or may not practice in
private life but which certainly does not intrude on the public sphere. As President Dwight Eisenhower put it, American public life "makes no sense unless it is founded on a deeply held religious belief—and I don't care what it is" (quoted in Herberg 1955: p84). Religious diversity works so long as religion doesn't matter very much. This is supposedly the secret to America's success.

Of course there are other factors. As Steve Warner and Judith Wittner (1998), Helen Rose Ebaugh and Janet Chafetz (2000), and others have shown, almost all immigrant religions adopt the congregational form pioneered by early American Protestants. Such congregational communities ease the transition to American life. As Ebaugh and Chafetz put it:

Whether it was the churches and synagogues of the earlier immigrants, or the churches, temples, mosques, gurdwaras, and storefront churches of today, religious centers serve as places where immigrants can worship in their own languages, enjoy the rituals, music, and festivals of their native lands, share stories from their homelands, and pass on their religious and cultural heritage to the next generation. Simultaneously, these religious centers help immigrants adapt to U.S. society by teaching them civic skills, providing economic and social services, providing the social space for networking, and affording status opportunities by creating socially valued religious roles. (p141)

This is the famous American “melting pot”, which the American Indian activist Vine Deloria described to me as “a cauldron in which the scum rises to the top and everything on the bottom gets burned”. More technically, it is what Paul Spickard (2007) calls “the Ellis Island model” of immigration, after the Ellis Island Federal Immigration Station in New York harbor, which processed much of the late-19th and early 20th century immigration from Europe, including many of my relatives. In this model, Latvians, Poles, Norwegians, Italians, French, Germans, Croatians, and the like all, in time, became Americans, as they discarded their native languages, attitudes, and identities to become one people.
Framing it this way points up the conceptual flaw: Latvians, Poles, Norwegians, etc. didn’t just become ‘Americans’; they became White Americans. African immigrants never had that option: the Middle Passage and the fire of slavery stripped away the differences between the Yoruba, Fon, Ibo, Ewe, Akan, and so forth, but it made them Black, not White. Chinese exclusion, Japanese internment, and so on kept ‘Asians’ separate. The fact that Gary Locke, America’s first Chinese-American state governor, got multiple death threats during his term of office was not a result of his policies; it was the color of his skin.

Today the problem is supposedly Mexicans. Anti-immigrant agitation has reached great heights in recent years, but it is not directed against those coming across America’s northern border, for most of them are White. Anti-immigrant feeling faces south. It does not matter that some of those stopped for “Driving While Latino” never crossed the border; instead, the border crossed over their ancestors after the 1846-1848 U.S.-Mexican war. Europe is familiar with such things: the French-German border has crossed over Alsace many times. In our case, the American Southwest’s many Hispanos and Indians are too often treated as foreigners in their own land.

The point is: race matters. The United States is no melting pot because race is still a source of difference and privilege. At best, the United States is a multi-cultural ‘salad’. That image, though, implies some unifying dressing that makes us all taste as if we belong at the same meal. Too bad; we haven’t got one. Diversity is the best we can do.

Caesura

So: how did we move from religion to race? Aren’t they fundamentally different sorts of things? Unless we’re Jews, both sociologists and ordinary folk have long treated race as something we’re born with but religion as something we can change. 19th- and early-20th-century Christians went to the corners of the earth to ‘convert heathens’, never imagining that they could make them White by doing so. Their scientific contemporaries argued about whether
there were three races or five or twelve, whether or not they all had a common origin, and how one should rank them, but none doubted that race was a biological matter fixed at birth. Only in the late 20th century did this view begin to change (Spickard 1989). By then, cross-border travel showed that racial systems are different in different places. A Pakistani-American, for example, is “White” at home, but was “Black” in the 1960s U.K., where he or she would now be labeled “Asian”. Race is now recognized as a malleable, if still not a matter of choice.

The 14th-century Arab historian Ibn Khaldûn (1958) had a clearer view. Best known for his analysis of the conflict between ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarism’, Khaldûn actually produced the first sociological analysis of multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. His approach has uses in the present day.

Ibn Khaldûn saw the history of his native Maghreb as a cyclic struggle between barbarism and civilization—‘tribes’ and ‘cities’, to use a contemporary shorthand. In his vision, nomads are typified by "Badâwah": “bedouinity” or “desert attitude”. They live a rude and savage life, forced by their harsh surroundings to stick together. Individuals cannot survive here, and are thus of no consequence. The tribe works as a unit, especially in response to outside threats. Its group-feeling is particularly strong. Compelled to courage and fortitude, its members support each other against all comers (I: 249-58). "Hatharah”—“town-dwelling” or “sedentarisation”—on the other hand, typifies city peoples, who are civilized, stable, and relatively rich. Agriculture, trading, and such livelihoods let them accumulate wealth. Having what they need to live, they think more of themselves and less of their neighbors, turning to magistrates and rulers to defend them both against their fellow citizens and against hostile outsiders. They depend on laws, not persons. In short, their living weakens their sense of group solidarity, so that they depend on social institutions for support (I: 249-50, 257-60).

Ibn Khaldûn argued that these two social types live in tension with each other. Harsh life makes tribes hang together, which enables them to conquer their softer neighbors. On doing so, they become rulers, who settle down and take on the civilized habits of their subjects. After
a couple of generations of sedentary life, they have lost their unity, so they fall to the next barbarian wave.

The first point, for our purposes, is that ethnicity is a source of social solidarity, but not a fixed one: it waxes and wanes. To Ibn Khaldûn, people lose their unity when their *al ‘assabiyah* or "group-feeling" declined. Town-dwellers are fractious and self-centered. They find it hard to act together, which makes them weak. He thought they could be roused to joint sacrifice, but only if the stimulus were great. They might, for example, come to identify themselves with their town or city, as had been the case for the Greek city-states. Citizenship for the Greeks played the role that ethnicity has played in other societies—an absolute necessity, given the nature of Greek warfare. (The hoplite phalanx, though effective, required that everyone live or die together.) In Ibn Khaldûn’s view, clan, tribe, ethnicity, citizenship, and so on formed potentially cross-cutting ties, each contributing (or not contributing) to the *al ‘assabiyah* exhibited at a given place and time. The historian or social analyst, he said, had to look at the exact situation on the ground. What ties of group-feeling are strongest? What solidarities are occluded? How have they shifted over time and what factors led them to do so? For him, none of these factors is fixed—just the opposite of 19th-century nationalist and racist dogma.

The second point concerns the role of religion. Ibn Khaldûn thought that religion could be one such locus of solidarity. By tying people together, religion could counteract a larger group's divisions, lending it the strength and unity that it needs to triumph (I: 305-6, 319-27). He used this insight to explain the 7th-century Arab conquests, which had been wide-ranging, sudden, and—given his reading of Arab social life—totally unexpected. The early Arabs, to him, we so tribally oriented that they could not unify around anything. It took the emergence of Islam as a strong, missionary religion to wield them into the unified force that conquered (and absorbed) three sides of the Mediterranean world.
This is not the place to explore Ibn Khaldûn’s work in any greater depth (see Dhaouadi 1990; Spickard 2001). For us, his approach is the first sociology of a multi-ethnic society—one in which religion played a key but varied role. Khaldûn saw religion as a parallel means of solidarity, alongside kinship, ethnicity, and so on. All were active in both tribes and cities, but in different strengths and combinations. The key element of his sociology, for our purposes, is that it puts ethnic group-feeling and religious group-feeling into the same mix.

Put otherwise: Ibn Khaldûn confronted socio-religious diversity and saw that it could lead to either chaos or unity, depending on the relative strengths of the various ‘assabiyah involved. He grasped ethnic and religious solidarities with the same set of concepts. We, too, need to make sure that we see ethnic and religious diversities—particularly those caused by immigration—in the same way.

Religious Diversity in the United States

This volume grew out of a conference for sociologists, so I would be remiss if I failed to present some data. The following table reports responses to questions about religious identification on the 2007 American Religious Landscape Survey, carried out by the Pew Forum for Religion and Public Life. “N” is over 35,000, which gives us a ±0.6% margin of error.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Religious Traditions in the U.S. (%% of Adult Americans)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian: .............................................................................. 78.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant: ............................................................................ 51.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical churches: ............................................................ 26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline churches: ................................................................. 18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically Black churches: ..................................................... 6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic: ................................................................................... 23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian: ......................................................................... 3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mormon: ..................................................................................... 1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehovah’s Witness: ..................................................................... 0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox (various kinds): ......................................................... 0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Religions: ........................................................................ 4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish: ..................................................................................... 1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist: .................................................................................. 0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim: ..................................................................................... 0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu: ...................................................................................... 0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first thing to note is that America has an overwhelmingly Christian population. This is not just true of the 86.8% of American adults who are native-born; 74% of foreign-born (immigrant) American adults identify as Christian, though many more of them are Catholic (46%) than Protestant (24%); in fact, that is just about the reverse of the native-born figures. About 9% of the foreign-born are non-Christian, as opposed to 4% of native-born. This is the source of the ‘new religious pluralism’ to which Warner, Ebaugh, Eck, and their co-workers refer. Sixteen percent of immigrants are religiously unaffiliated, exactly the same as the population at large. In short, immigration is indeed changing America’s religious landscape, but it is not changing it as much as we might think.

Second, the most prominent shift in American religious life is from affiliation to non-affiliation. Just 6.6% of American adults claimed to have “no religion” on the 1973 General Social Survey; the 2010 figure was 18%. The shift was more pronounced among native-born adults than among those born elsewhere, but non-affiliation grew among them, also. If numbers were all that mattered, religious diversity ought to be less of a ‘problem’ than religious defection. But the size of a social phenomenon does not always dictate its cultural importance.

These numbers are misleading, however, and in two senses. First, there is a lot of diversity within American Christianity, especially Protestantism. For example, the Pew survey divides the Evangelical Protestants into 16 major traditions, each of which is made up of many denominations. Not all of these are on speaking terms, despite doctrinal similarities. My college town, for example, is home to three different Dutch Reformed churches, from separate denominations, who have little to do with each other. There is thus much more diversity than
the table leads us to expect. It is just among Christians, not between Christians and other groups.

Second, the 16% with "no religion" are less atheist and agnostic than they are “nothing in particular”. I guess that’s how the 2010 General Social Survey can report that 21% of those claiming “no religion” pray at least daily, half of those more than once. Hout and Fischer (2002) traced this to liberal disgust with Evangelical Protestantism’s increased engagement in politics; Putnam and Campbell (2010) recently made the same argument with different and more extensive data. Claiming “no religion” is thus not so much a statement about one’s beliefs as about one’s unwillingness to be identified with religious organizations.

In sum, America is beset by considerable religion and by considerable diversity, albeit most of it Christian. Religion matters here, but the same religion does not matter to everyone.

_Dealing with Diversity_

How does one unify a country this diverse? Despite the Ellis Island / Melting Pot myth, American immigrants have never all assimilated to the Anglo-Saxon norm: not racially, not culturally, not religiously. Religious tolerance has periodically worked, most recently during Eisenhower’s 1950s, when denominational religion ruled, not the sectarians. Yes, there were evangelicals and fundamentalists around, though they kept to themselves. Catholics were finally elected to high office. Still, my childhood Jewish friends had stomachaches all December from the school Christmas festivities and no one noticed—something not possible today. Yet there was relative religious peace.

Times have changed. American politics are now religiously polarized. It is too much to claim that the Evangelical Christian Right has captured the Republican Party, but presidential candidates routinely trumpet their right-wing Christian credentials in primary elections, when that party’s most committed voters go to the polls. The Public Religion Research Institute (2012) reported two weeks before the 2012 presidential election that 76% of likely White Evangelical
voters supported the Republican candidate, compared to the 73% of religiously unaffiliated voters who supported the Democrat. Mark Chaves (2011:pp95-6) has demonstrated an increasing correlation between church attendance, political conservatism, and Republican Party affiliation—explained almost entirely by the increasing embrace of that party by White Evangelical Protestants.

In brief, American public life has become sectarian—in both the religious and the political senses of that word. Denominational thinkers, like Diana Eck, may wish for “the active seeking of understanding across lines of difference” (Pluralism Project 1) but her opponents are not listening. It is worth reminding ourselves that denominationally oriented people like she recognize the legitimacy of other religious views, while sectarians do not. Pluralist dialogue asks all sides to engage in conversation. Not everyone is willing to come to the table.

So: how does one craft a society that encourages social cooperation without stifling the ethnic, religious, and social diversity that are increasingly inevitable? What kinds of social unity do we need? The American experience does have something to say about this, though it is not the part of America that we have seen so far.

There are at least three ways to craft a unified social order. Emile Durkheim (1893) uncovered two of them over a century ago. First, we can make sure that everyone is alike: what he called “mechanical solidarity”, in which people stick together because of their similarities. In this kind of society, people are connected by common ideas, common rituals, and the common practices of daily life. Religious and ethnic diversity threatens this. Exclusion tried to recreate it, but so did the original American “melting pot”, in the hope that by dissolving away people’s foreignness, socio-political unity can emerge. Will Herberg’s (1955) picture of American religious life points in this direction, as religion (in his view) no longer defines one’s core being. Instead, it becomes a cloak lightly worn, a matter of personality and style. His American Jews would never be ultra-Orthodox, his Catholics never ultramontane. His portrayal of Protestantism
drew from the Mainline, not the Fundamentalists, whom he thought fringe. Little could he see the Evangelical resurgence two decades down the road.

Herberg was not wrong, of course: there is much truth to his idea that religion is different in America and that immigration changes the shape of the faiths transplanted here. Warner and Wittner (1998), Ebaugh and Chafetz (2000), and others have shown how American congregationalism has stamped immigrant religions with an organizational form that they had not previously known. But the underlying issue remains: the melting pot did not produce social unity, neither ethnically nor religiously. Nor should we expect it to do so.

Durkheim called his second route “organic solidarity”, by which he referred to the ties that emerge because we all have different jobs, skills, and tastes, and because our complex economy needs these differences to prosper. Our current division of labor stretches across the globe. To take just one example: our shirts are sewn in Haiti or Vietnam from cotton grown in Tajikistan or El Salvador mixed with polyester from Venezuela or Iran; they are shipped on Liberian or Indian freighters with international (skeleton) crews. Only the selling is local and this only sometimes. This “unity” is a matter of function. Durkheim worried that such society would give people too little in common to avoid social breakdown; his book Suicide (1897) is a treatise on just how this can play out in individual lives.

America provides a third model. Robert Bellah (1967) famously described American “civil religion” as a set of concepts, ritual phrases, and ideals that construct a national sense of purpose. “Civil religion” is not henotheism, a term that theologian H. Richard Niebuhr (1960) used to denote worship of the group itself. It is not worship of a society or a nation, and it is certainly not patriotism. It is, instead, an identity crafted from a sense of mission: a sense that America has a set of special tasks to carry out in the world. The American political Left and Right agree about this “American exceptionalism”; they just do not agree about what those tasks are. Right-wingers think America’s purpose is to promote capitalism and ‘make the world safe for democracy’. Left-wingers choose human rights and individual freedoms. The two sides thus
support different interventions: the Right supported America’s invasion of Iraq; the Left was more interested in invading Afghanistan to aid suppressed women. We can perhaps trace our recent political discord to these competing civil religions; doing might help us better see how deeply these visions are held.

Bellah rightly noted that all such national callings are prophetic. Indeed, like the Old Testament prophets, American civil religion calls both government and society to account for their misdeeds. “With great power comes great responsibility” ⁹ was an effective movie line because it resonates so deeply with American culture. To be exceptional, America’s national sense of purpose cannot merely be self-serving. To frame this in identity-language, Americans (in this ideology) are the people who are called to serve everyone. The ideals for which America is famous—democracy, freedom, justice—are an as-yet unfinished project. Can a country shape its collective identity around helping everyone attain them?

In this vision, America begins in diversity, but pluralism is not just a matter of diverse people talking civilly with one another. Pluralism is diversity on a mission. The mission binds us together. This kind of unity is eschatological, embedded in national ideals.

Here we reencounter al ‘assabiyyah. In this view, religious group-feeling is not just a matter of a shared history, nor is it just a matter of contemporary need. The ‘assabiyyah that Ibn Khaldûn saw in Islam stemmed from a shared purpose: to bring about the rule of Allah on earth and to bring all peoples to righteousness. This enabled religion to unify fractious ethnic groups into a purposeful force. As Ibn Khaldûn predicted, that unity soon flagged. The vision dimmed, though perhaps it just turned sweeter: mystical Sufism had its own vision for a just and connected world, one that it succeeded in fostering for centuries.

Sweet or forceful, can a civil religion of ideals bring people together, leaving room for their diversity within a larger mission. Again, this is more than Eck’s call to dialogue. Civil religion has a visionary calling at its core.
Qualms

Yet I have qualms. I hope I do not need to remind readers of the gap between my country’s ideals and its realities. We proclaim democracy but we support dictators. We avow independent self-government while we practice empire. The long-past war in Vietnam was no outlier; it was part of the main trend. So, I am afraid, is the illegal prison at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba—which is itself an imperial imposition on a sovereign neighbor—the atrocities at Abu Ghraib, and undeclared wars without counting. My country has plenty of dirty laundry (see, *inter alia*, Johnson 2004, Zinn 2003). I frequently air it at home—and in doing so I engage in that same prophetic civil religion that Bellah described. I call on my country to live up to its ideals and to end its sinful ways.

There, is, however, a second point of worry. American culture has undergone a shift in recent years, away from this quasi-religious national mission to a distinctly economic one. To be blunt about it, America is now the place where people hope to get rich. We are still the land of freedom, but now it is freedom to enjoy our wealth rather than to do good in the world. Former President George W. Bush didn’t actually urge Americans to “keep on shopping” as a response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks; he did, however, identify our vibrant economy as the thing that our enemies envy and he asked Americans to continue participating in it.\(^\text{10}\) However, the fact that so many people believe that Bush did say “keep on shopping” tells us something culturally important. We joke about our national addiction to shopping malls and about our need for what our comedians call “retail therapy”. We even have a clothing chain called “True Religion” that sells very expensive designer jeans. Have economic enrichment and the resulting consumption become the new American national purpose? Durkheim worried about this—not the consumption part, so much, but about the individualism and anomie that he feared would come from treating our economic differentiation as life’s main goal. Bellah also worried about this. So do I.
We are, however, in Europe, not in the United States. You have more immigrants than you did before, and more of them come from diverse lands. They bring with them strange skin colors, customs, allegiances, and—yes—religions. Will your “pluralism” be just a matter of talking together? Or will your plurality find its unity in a sense of mission to the world? Put otherwise, can Europe find its own civil religion, beyond the religions of nationalism and of wealth? Can Europe become prophetic, as it maintains its high standard of living? And can you avoid the pitfalls that have entrapped us, on the other side of the pond?

That is an old question. It is also a Christian one—though not just Christian, I hasten to add. Jesus had a few things to say about the difficulty of serving God while still being economically comfortable.
NOTES

1 As of March 2013, these lectures have not been published. They are, however, available for viewing on YouTube at http://www.youtube.com/user/GiffordLectures?feature=mhee. Accessed 9 March, 2013.

2 This was the 19th century Chinese term for America.

3 Personal communication, 1975. He probably did not invent the phrase but he is the first whom I heard speak it and he used it a lot. I have not found a better or earlier attribution.

4 DWI stands for “driving while intoxicated”. DWB (“driving while Black”) and DWL (“driving while Latino”) are spin-offs that highlight the common police practice of pulling over minority group drivers as a means of intimidation.

5 But see Douglas (1970).

6 All years of the General Social Survey are available for online analysis at the Berkeley Social Data Archive: http://sda.berkeley.edu.

7 Catholics and Mainline Protestants were split, in part along racial and ethnic lines. Race mattered in this election more than it had in years when both candidates were White.

8 See the long discussion of group and individual attitudes in McGuire (2002:ch. 4).

9 The original is reportedly by Voillaume. It is a key line in the 2002 Spiderman movie from Columbia Pictures.

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1. http://pluralism.org/pages/pluralism/what_is_pluralism


